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Dual Class Firms and Debt Issuance 
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Concordia University, 2015 
 
We examine the impact of dual class share structures on the parameters of debt issuance. We 
find that, as compared to single class firms, the debt in dual class firms is associated more use of 
covenants especially performance based covenants, and is more likely to be secured. In addition, 
the impact of dual class share structure differs based on the severity of the agency costs of debt. 
We find that many of these issuance parameters are differently affected for large, profitable and 
low leverage firms (which face lower agency costs of debt) as opposed to small, less profitable 
and highly levered firms. These results are robust when we control the endogeneity of ownership 
structure and simultaneous changes in these issuance parameters. These results suggest that dual 
class share structures exacerbate the conflicts between controlling shareholders and lenders. 
However, the link between dual class share structures and debt issuance is not as clear for other 
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Dual class share structures have existed for a long time. Controlling shareholders may 
often use a dual class structure to maintain control over a firm when it transitions from private to 
public. Such firms issue two classes of shares: one class is for public shareholders and the other 
one is for insiders, like company founders and executives. The class offered to the general public 
has limited voting rights, while the class available to founders and executives has more voting 
power and often provides a majority control of the company. But both classes of shares have the 
same cash flow rights. In this way, dual class policy often results in a significant difference 
between insider voting rights and cash flow rights. This divergence exacerbates the agency 
conflicts in the dual class firms. In this essay we focus on two different forms of the agency 
conflict: one is between controlling shareholders and external debtholders, the other one is 
between majority (controlling shareholders) and minority shareholders.  Since insiders control 
disproportionately more voting rights than cash flow rights, when they make bad financial 
decisions, they suffer less than other investors. Moreover, they have more power to reject a 
promising project, which benefits the firm but would threaten their private benefits or continued 
employment in the firm. In support of this reasoning, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) 
document that when the divergence of voting and cash flow rights becomes larger, the stock 
returns and firm values are lower.  
Specifically, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) analyze the relationship between insider 
ownership and firm value by using a list of dual class firms in US. According to their list of dual 
class firms, they find that about 6% of all firms in the Compustat database are dual class firms, 
which contribute to 8% of the market capitalization. On average, insiders have about 60% of the 
voting rights and 40% of the cash flow rights in dual class firms. Moreover, for up to 40% of 
these dual class firms, insiders have more than half of the voting rights so that they are able to 
provide effective control over the firm.  However, insiders possess less than half of the cash flow 
rights. Finally, they discover that dual class share structures significantly affect firm performance 
and valuation, as firm value is positively related to insiders’ cash flow rights, negatively related 
to insiders’ voting rights, and also negatively related to the difference between them. 
In addition to the negative effect of dual class policy on the firm’s value, Masulis et al. 
(2009) explain the reason why firm value decreases when a divergence exists between the 
insiders’ voting and cash flow rights. Their findings suggest that when the difference between 
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insider voting rights and cash flow rights grows larger, the consequences are that the CEOs will 
receive higher compensation, the managers tend to make more acquisitions that destroy value for 
shareholders, and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value. These findings are 
consistent with the agency hypothesis, which indicates that greater excess control rights over 
cash flow rights encourage the controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the minority 
shareholders’ expense. 
On one hand, the disparity between voting and cash flow rights affects firm value by 
creating an agency conflict between insiders and public shareholders (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick, 2010). On the other hand, compared to single class firms, dual class structures can also 
bring considerable benefits by alleviating some problems present in widely held companies: 
lowering the monitoring cost, and allowing insiders to make discretionary decisions that enhance 
firm value (see Burkart and Lee, 2008).  
The private cost of issuing equity is higher when votes are tied to cash flow rights. 
Therefore, considering the risk of losing control, insiders may choose not to go public with the 
one share - one vote policy. Instead, they may turn to inferior forms of financing, which is more 
expensive and thus increase the investment cost, slow the firm’s growth and lower the firm’s 
value. However, in widely- held firms, it is more difficult and expensive to transfer control and 
the free-rider problem is more universal. 
 In conclusion, although a dual class share structure can result in greater conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders, it can also, in certain situation, lead to a higher value for 
the firm.  
Dey, Wang and Nilolaev (2012) show a link between dual class firms and leverage. They 
suggest that the use of debt is a useful way to control insiders’ behavior, so that it can further 
reduce the agency conflicts among shareholder classes. In the presence of significant leverage, 
insiders will not have as much excess cash to invest in unprofitable projects or to extract private 
benefits. In addition, prospective debtholders are expected to carefully evaluate a firm before 
debt issuance and, as a result, are efficient monitors. In cases where the firm has poor 
performance or goes bankrupt, the lenders can take control of the firm and replace the 
management based on the covenants in the loan contract. As a result, Dey, Wang and Nikolaev 
(2012) find that dual class firms often choose to use more debt in the capital structure due to the 
efficient governance role of debt. 
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Although Dey, Wang and Nilolaev (2012) show a link between dual class firms and 
leverage, they do not explore the debt issuance process. In this paper we fill that gap: we 
examine the impact of dual class share structures on the parameters of debt issuance. The role of 
debt may attract dual class firms to use debt more frequently but the agency problem may impact 
every aspect of a loan contract, including interest spread, maturity, syndication and the use of 
covenants. Moreover, the agency problems that arise as a result of dual-class shares could result 
in two distinct and opposing effects on the terms of lending. First, controlling shareholders in 
dual class firms could have more power and therefore have more opportunities to expropriate 
debt holders. Second, as noted by Anderson and Reeb (2003) controlling shareholders such as 
founding families have a greater interest in the long term survival of the firm and therefore favor 
the interests of debt holders over those of minority shareholders. Dual class share structures in 
such situations would, in fact, better safeguard the interests of the lenders. In either case, lenders 
may propose different loan contracts for dual class firms and single class firms in terms of 
interest spread and maturity. Specifically, we focus on two issues: 
 Comprehensive analysis of the manner in which dual class policy affects debt 
issuance: specifically, maturity, spread, syndication and the use of secured vs. non-secured loans. 
We also examine the use of covenants, following the research of Dey, Wang and Nilolaev (2012). 
 We hypothesize that the manner in which dual class share structures affect these 
issuance parameters differs for large, profitable and low leverage firms (that we hypothesize face 
lower agency costs of debt as per Jensen and Meckling 1976) as opposed to small, less profitable 
and highly levered firms. In other words the impact of dual class share structure differs based on 
the severity of the agency costs of debt. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the development of the 
five hypotheses. In this section, we also introduce the model and control variables. Section III 
describes the sample of dual class companies used in this study. Section IV shows results for the 
basic OLS regressions, subsample tests and robustness tests.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. Prior research and hypotheses 
In this section, we do the literature review and provide our hypotheses about dual class 
firms and debt issuance. For each aspect of the issuance process, we provide some prior research 
results, introduce the specific hypothesis and explain the model used to test that hypothesis. 
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1). Dual class firms and interest spread 
We firstly focus on the cost of debt. As we know, when the insiders hold large control 
rights over the firm, they have the incentives to expropriate other investors by increasing the 
compensation and personal welfare, transferring assets and profits out of companies and 
engaging in unprofitable projects for their personal interests. This phenomenon is more universal 
when the wedge between the inside voting and cash flow rights is large. According to Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) and Johnson, Simon, et al (2000), because insiders with super voting rights 
have strong control of the firm, they have greater ability to pursue their own interest and bear a 
smaller proportion of the financial consequence of such activities. These activities will increase 
the probability of lower-tail outcomes which cost more, and these outcomes can increase the 
expected costs associated with financial distress and bankruptcy. In this way, the value of the 
collateral will also decrease. Considering the higher possibility of negative outcomes and the 
lower value of the collateral, lenders often propose higher interest spread and increase the cost of 
debt financing. In the prior research, Lin et al. (2011) also find that the cost of debt financing is 
significantly higher for companies with a wider divergence between the largest ultimate owner’s 
control rights and cash flow rights. Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the problem 
of expropriation by controlling shareholders might become more severe when the investors 
include the creditors. With greater control rights, insiders are able to divert the upside gains for 
private benefits while leaving the costs of failure to creditors. Thus, the lenders face more severe 
agency problem, and in turn will increase the financing cost.  
Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: The debt in dual class firms will have larger interest spread. 
We test our hypothesis using the following specification: 
INTEREST= α0+ α1 × DUAL+ α2 × LOANSIZE+ α3 × FIRMSIZE + α4 × CREDITRATING + 
α5 × REVOLVER + α6 × PURPOSE+ α7 × INSTITUTIONAL + α8 × BTM +ɛ 
  (1) 
In the above model (1), the dependent variable is interest spread. The interest spread is 
based on the all-in-spread-drawn measure reported by Dealscan. This measure is equal to the 
amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down, so it accounts 
for both the spread of the loan and the annual fee paid to the bank group. Our variable of interest 
is the indicator variable DUAL, which equals 1 for dual class firms and 0 otherwise. The control 
5 
 
variables in equation (1) are based on the literature on the determinants of interest spread 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Lemmon et al., 2008, Frank and Goyal, 2009). See Appendix for a 
description of all dependent and independent variables for this as well as subsequent hypotheses. 
 
2). Dual class firms and debt maturity 
In developing the first hypothesis, the lenders tend to increase the interest spread to 
protect themselves against the severe agency problem in dual class firms. Consistent with this 
view, the lenders will also shorten the debt’s maturity to avoid agency problems, because longer 
maturity increases uncertainty and risk.  
However, prior studies also suggest that dual class firms are more likely to subject 
themselves to private debt as a way to build lending relationships. Since private lenders are 
superior monitors (Diamond, 1984), they often have access to more information (Fama, 1985). In 
certain environments, they are able to exercise control rights over internal decisions (Dichev and 
Skinner, 2002; Baird and Rasmussen, 2006). Moerman (2009) finds that in the presence of 
information asymmetry, it is useful to reduce debt maturity. Conversely, if the (private) lenders 
have access to more information, they will provide dual class firms debt with longer maturity.  
We can develop our second hypothesis on the basis of the first hypothesis. Taking 
maturity into consideration, we believe that the debt’s maturity should be affected by the agency 
problem, which is consistent with the first hypothesis. Therefore, our second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H2: The debt in dual class firms is associated with a shorter maturity. 
For the model, we’d like to use the following one: 
MATURITY= α0 + α1 × DUAL+ α2 × FIRMSIZE + α3 × CREDITRATING + 
 α4 × ASSETMATURITY   + α5 × ASSETTANGIBILITY + α6 × PURPOSE + α7 × BTM + ɛ 
(2) 
In this model, the dependent variable is maturity, which is the number of months between 
the debt’s issue date and the date when the debt matures. The independent variable of interest is 
DUAL, and we also include the following control variables: firmsize, creditrating, assetmaturity, 
assettangibility, purpose and btm.  
Barclay et al. (2003) and Johnson (2003) find that firms tend to match the maturity of 
their assets with the maturity of their liabilities. Because matching maturity choices may assist 
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borrowers to issue longer maturity debt without significantly increasing the agency costs 
associated with longterm liabilities. We use the asset maturity measure based on empirical 
knowledge (Stohs and Mauer, 1996, Johnson, 2003). Details of the measure are described in the 
appendix. 
Prior research shows that short-term debt is popular for firms with higher growth options 
(Barclay et al., 2003, and Johnson, 2003). This finding is consistent with Myers’ (1977) 
prediction that firms with greater growth opportunities can control for underinvestment problem 
by shortening debt maturity. Following previous studies, we estimate growth options by the 
borrower’s asset tangibility. In the debt maturity estimation, we also incorporate other 
contractual terms of a loan (such us purpose) and some firm-level variables (firm size, rating and 
btm). 
 
3). Dual class firms and covenants 
The use of financial covenants can control the conflicts of interest between lenders and 
borrowers. Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) study this topic and they argue that splitting 
financial covenants into performance and capital covenants is central to understanding the way 
accounting is used to control agency problems. P-covenants (or performance based covenants) 
rely on measures of a firm’s profitability and efficiency, while C-covenants (or capital based 
covenants) rely on balance sheet information about sources and uses of capital. In other words, 
performance covenants put more weights on firm’s accounting information, while capital based 
covenants focus on the firm’s capital structure. Companies will balance the benefits and 
drawbacks of these two kinds of covenants when they engage into the debt contract. 
They also suggest that, on one hand, performance-based covenants act as tripwires that 
transfer control to lenders when the firm has worse performance and the severe conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and lenders appear. On the other hand, capital based covenants 
align the bondholder-shareholder interests by requiring shareholders to have adequate wealth 
inside the firm. Because controlling insiders in dual class firms only have a small amount of their 
wealth in their firms, c-covenants are unlikely to be as effective as p-covenants in effectively 
restraining them from actions that diminish firm value.  
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Hence, dual class firms are more likely to rely on tripwire-type performance based 
covenants, whereas they are less likely to use capital based covenants. And our third hypothesis 
is: 
H3: The debt in dual class firms uses less capital based covenants, but more 
performance-based covenants. 
Based on prior research, the model below is suitable for our study: 
COVENANT= α0 + α1 × DUAL+ α2 × FIRMSIZE + α3 × REVOLVER + α4 × SECURITY +  
α5 × LOANSIZE+ α6 × ROA+ α7 × LEVERAGE + ɛ 
(3) 
In the above model (3), the dependent variable is covenant, c_covenant or p_covenant. 
We define covenant as the total number of covenants used in the contract, c_covenant as the 
number of capital based covenants, and p_covenant as the number of performance based 
covenants. We will study covenants first, and then split it as c_covenant and p_covenant to see 
the specific difference.  
 
4). Dual class firms and loan syndication 
As we discuss before, dual class firms have more serious agency problems than single 
class firms. These problems often comes with higher credit risks and  require more due diligence 
and monitor when the firm engage into a loan contract. In order to diversify the credit risks and 
share the monitor cost, lenders tend to find other participants to syndicate a loan (Lin et al. 2012). 
Therefore, we propose our forth hypothesis: 
H4: The debt in dual class firms is more likely to be syndicated. 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) are the first to systematically study factors determining 
the decision to syndicate a loan using data from the DealScan database maintained by Loan 
Pricing Corporation. Their research suggests that the determinants of the decision to syndicate a 
loan are the quality of information about the firm, variables involving agency problems, loan and 
agent characteristics. They find that a loan will be more likely to be syndicated (and not end up 
as a lending relationship between a single lender and the borrower) as information about the firm 
becomes more transparent, as the reputation of the lead bank grows and as the loan’s maturity 




SYNDICATION= α0 + α1 × DUAL + α2 × LEVERAGE + α3 × LOANSIZE + α4 × BTM  
+ α5 × FIRMSIZE + ɛ 
 (4) 
The SYNDICATION dependent variable is a (0, 1) dummy which reflects the 
originator’s decision to syndicate (1) or not (0). Therefore, logistic model is suitable in this case. 
Although longer maturity will increase the probability of syndicating a loan, we choose not to 
include maturity in this model because we have already used it as dependent variable in model 
(2). We will address this problem of the simultaneous changes in dependent variables later in the 
FIML test.  
 
5). Dual class firms and secured loans 
The use of secured debt may benefit borrowers and lenders in several ways: to alleviate 
the problems of asset substitution and underinvestment, to reduce foreclosure costs, to mitigate 
the problem of claim dilution, to limit possible claims in bankruptcy, and at last to minimize the 
problem arising from information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders (Chen, Yeo and 
Ho, 1998). However, the use of secured debts also is costly since it requires security registration 
and valuation and monitoring of collateral, and imposes restrictions on asset usage. In this way, 
lenders may consider thoroughly to balance the advantages and disadvantages of secured debt.  
Chen, Yeo and Ho (1998) argue that the use of secured and unsecured loans is 
determined by the firm size and loan size. More specifically, smaller firms with large loan size 
are more prone to use secured loans. In contrast, Leeth and Scott (1989), using survey data on 
small firms, find an insignificant firm size effect. They find that the use of secured debt is 
positively related to probability of default, loan size and loan maturity. According to these 
findings, we provide our last hypothesis that  
H5: The debt in dual class firms is more likely to be secured. 
 In this paper, we use the firm’s BTM, Leverage and its zscore to measure the probability 
of default. And the final model is as follows: 
SECURED= α0 + α1 × DUAL + α2 × FIRMSIZE + α3 × LOANSIZE + α4 × BTM  




In model (5), SECURED is the dependent variable, which is a dummy variable and 
equals to one when the loan is secured, zero otherwise. Here, we also use logistic regression as 
the syndication model.  
 
Above all, the hypotheses are summarized as follows: compared to the debt in single 
class firms, the debt in dual class firms tends to have higher interest spread, shorter maturity, 
more use of p_covenant, more likely to be syndicated and secured. These hypotheses are based 
on the point of severe agency problem in dual class firms, which means that dual class firms 
could worsen the conflict of interests between equity holders and debt holders due to the excess 
power of equity holders. This kind of agency conflict is only one example of agency problems. 
However, there is a possible second kind of agency problem: dual class firms may also 
deteriorate the conflict between majority and minority equity holders. As we know from 
Anderson and Reeb (2003)
1
, insiders with higher control rights focus on the investment with a 
longer horizon, and tend to align their interests with debt holders, rather than with other 
shareholders so as to expropriate minority shareholders. This bonding relationship reconciles the 
agency problems and benefits the insiders with lower cost of debt. In this way, we will get five 
reversing predictions with respect to DUAL above. Specifically, for dual class firms, the lenders 
will lower the cost of debt, extend the maturity, and require less p_covenants and collateral and 
less syndication will occur. 




We obtain a comprehensive list of dual-class companies that Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2010) construct from the universe of U.S. public firms over the 1994–2002 periods2. More than 
6% of firms covered by Compustat have a dual class structure, and they represent about 8% of 
the total market capitalization of Compustat firms. A typical dual class company has two classes 
of stock: the superior class, which has multiple votes per share and is not publicly traded, and the 
                                                          
1
 Anderson, Ronald C., and David M. Reeb. "Founding‐family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the 
S&P 500." The journal of finance 58.3 (2003): 1301-1327. 
2
 We thank Andrew Metrick for making this data widely available. 
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inferior class, which has one vote per share and is generally publicly traded.  There are 741 dual 
class firms and 3730 firm-year observations in this dataset. 
We search the entire Compustat database for firms from year 1994 to 2002 and merge 
them to GIM sample. Then we use Compustat-dealscan link
3
 to merge our sample with dealscan 
dataset.  Dealscan database comes from Loan Pricing Corporation, which contains publicly 
available information on more than fifty thousand corporate loans booked since 1986. The 
database provides the name of the lead lender as well as the details of loans (purpose, size, 
maturity, etc.).  
By merging these two dataset, we get the final sample of firms with debt issuances for 
which the details are available on Dealscan. It contains 389 firm-year dual-class firms’ 
observations and 6064 firm-year single-class firms’ observations from year 19954 to year 2002. 
The detailed observations distribution for each year is presented in table 1. More than half 
observations are concentrated in year 2002
5
. We also present the mean firm size, leverage and 
profitability for each year in Table 1.  
Table 1 shows the data description for all firms in our sample. We show the size, leverage 
and profitability for each kind of firms. In our sample, out of 6453 observations, there are 389 
(about 6%) dual class firm-year observations. This proportion is consistent with the finding in 
Dey, Nilolaev and Wang (2012), who study the relationship between dual class share structure 
and loan contracts for year 1994-2010. Generally speaking, these dual class firms have larger 
size, higher leverage but lower profitability, compared to single class firms. This finding is also 
consistent for each year from 1995 to 2002. As time passes, all firms increase the firm size and 




1) Univariate test 
                                                          
3
 We thank Michael Roberts for sharing this data on his website at: 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/styled-9/styled-12/index.html. The related paper is Chavaand Roberts 
(2008). 
4
 We start our study from 1995 because no dual class firms issue loans in 1994; we also drop observations of the 
single class firms in year 1994. 
5
 A possible explanation is that the information in Dealscan is less exhaustive in the early years and improves over 
time. In conjunction with the increase in the number of listed firms, this gives us a sample that has few observations 
in the early years and many more in the latter years.  
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In the first test, we want to examine whether there exist some differences in the basic 
characteristics of dual class firms and single class firms. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for 
the sample firms. We present the mean and median of firm characteristics across the two 
samples, and test for differences between single and dual class firms. The dual class firms differ 
significantly from the single class firms in several aspects. Specifically, compared to single class 
firms, dual class firms are larger, less profitable and have higher leverage. In addition, we 
observe at the deal level that dual class firms have loans with larger amounts and longer 
maturities as compared to single class firms. Dual class firms are more likely to syndicate loans 
and include more performance based covenants in their loan contracts. At first glance, these 
results suggest that dual class firms suffer from greater conflicts of interests as outlined in our 
hypotheses. 
 
2) Multivariate test  
In our second test, we check the effects of dual class share policy on the debt parameters. In table 
3, we construct twelve regressions. The dependent variables are interest spread, maturity and 
covenant. For each dependent variable, we do four regressions: with and without control 
variables, with and without year fixed effects. Our focus is on the independent variable: DUAL. 
The coefficient of DUAL for interest spread (in the model (2) with control variables) is positive 
but not significant, which implies that the cost of debt issuance is a little higher for dual class 
firms, but once controlled for other variables it is not significantly different. Hence, our first 
hypothesis is only correct for some degree (due to positive but insignificant coefficient). 
Moreover, the magnitude of the impact of dual class share structures on the spread appear to be 
fairly small – even in the specifications where DUAL is significant, the impact on the spread is 
only about 10 basis points. Overall, our OLS tests do not indicate any important relationship 
between dual class shares structures and the cost of debt.  
From table 3, we also find that DUAL is positive and significant for maturity. For dual 
class firms, the issued debt has longer maturity; this result indicates that dual class policy 
positively affects the length of maturity. Lenders tend to provide dual class firms with longer 
maturity. This finding differs from our predications in hypothesis 2, because the conflict between 
the insiders and debt holders due to the larger agency problems should result in shorter maturity 
according to the hypothesis. But this reversing result can be explained by the alignment of 
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insiders (large shareholders) and debtholders. The lenders provide benefits to the insiders by 
providing longer maturity of debt. We also find that, the coefficient of DUAL for maturity is 
9.396, which is much larger than the coefficients of other control variables. It indicates a larger 
impact of dual class share structure than other controls for each incremental unit in these 
variables. Therefore, the dual class structure impacts the maturity of a firm’s debt with 
economical and statistical significance. All the findings are consistent whether we include year 
fixed effects or not in our regressions. 
The issued debt typically has more covenants as we can see from table 3.The coefficient 
of DUAL is positive and significant, which means that the lenders require stronger guarantee 
against default from dual class firms due to the larger agency problem. In table 4, we further 
study the use of covenants and split covenants into capital based covenant and performance 
based covenant. The interesting thing is DUAL is significant for p_covenant but not for 
c_covenant. Since dual class firms have more covenants as we shown in table 3, we can conclude 
that the difference in covenant attribute to the difference in performance based covenant. This 
finding is consistent to the third hypothesis, which is dual class firms use more performance 
based covenants. It indicates that, compared to capital-based covenants, tripwire-type 
performance-based covenants work better in dual class firms to discipline the insiders. However, 
we don’t find a significantly less use of capital based covenants, then we cannot show any 
relationship between dual class share structure and capital based covenants. 
In addition to above dependent variables, we also investigate two dummy variables: 
syndication and secured. We get the logistic results from SAS and show them in table 5. We find 
that DUAL is positive for both syndication and secured, but only significant for secured, which 
means that dual class structure has important impact on the use of secured loans, but cannot 
affect the decision to syndicate the loan. This finding is consistent to our fifth hypothesis that the 
debt in dual class firms is more likely to be secured. The debt holders require collaterals to 
protect themselves from larger agency problems in dual class firms. In a word, our results imply 
that the issued debt need to be secured for dual class firms, syndication or not doesn’t matter.  
Overall, these OLS results show that the dual class share structure could have an impact 
on the debt issuance parameters. However, it remains unclear whether dual class share structures 
improve or worsen the conflicts between majority shareholders and lender.   
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3) Subsample test 
Till now, our results indicate that the debt in dual class firms has a longer maturity, 
higher possibility to be secured and contains more performance based covenants. And we show 
that the conflicts and alignments between the insiders and debtholders exist at the same time. To 
further prove their existence, we do the subsample test as below.  
If the differences come from the severe agency problem in dual class firms, then the 
effects should be more significant for certain firms like small, less profitable and highly levered 
firms, because these kinds of firms often face more severe agency problems (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). It is also possible that the agency problems may come from these firm 
characteristics instead of the dual class share structure. Although we control for firm 
characteristics in our OLS tests earlier, it is possible that the effect of these firm characteristics is 
not linear. Therefore, we use subsamples to test this and divide the whole sample into 
subsamples by the median of full sample’s firm size, leverage and profitability6. In each 
subsample, the dependent variables are the same: Interest, maturity, c_covenant, p_covenant, 
syndication and secured. We use the same regression equations with control variables as we 
describe in the hypotheses part. But for brevity, we suppress control variables and only show the 
results of variable DUAL.  
Table 6 shows the results. We find that in highly leveraged, low profit firms, the 
coefficient of DUAL for maturity is positive and significant while the coefficient of DUAL for 
secured is negative and significant. This indicates that lenders provide dual class firms the debt 
with longer maturity and use less secured loans. This is consistent with the explaining of 
alignment between insiders and debtholders. Moreover, the coefficient of DUAL for p_covenant 
is positive and significant, which is the result of larger agency problems. But from this result we 
cannot conclude that the agency problems come from the dual class share structure, because 
firms with higher leverage and low profitability are observed to have larger agency problems. 
When we look at the subsample of large firms, we are surprised to find that the 
coefficient of p_covenant is positive and significant, which means the dual class share structure 
has a significant impact on the use of p_covenant. Since the increasing use of p_covenant can be 
explained by larger agency problems, and large firms face less agency problems, we can 
                                                          
6
 We also divide the firms by the mean and quartiles of full sample’s firm size, leverage and profitability for 
robustness. The results are qualitatively similar, so we don’t present them here.  
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conclude that the agency problems result from the dual class share structure. In other words, this 
finding suggests that dual class share structure result in larger agency problems and these agency 
problems finally result in the increasing use of p_covenant in the loan contracts. We also test the 
equal slope for each subsample. The slopes are significantly different for maturity and 
p_covenant across each subsample while interest spread and syndication have the same slopes. 
The results for c_covenant and secured vary. 
Overall, the subsamples further indicate that the influence of dual class share structures 
on debt issuance parameters can be attributed to a combination of the agency conflict between 
insiders and debtholders and the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders.  
 
4)  Robustness tests 
Robustness tests are provided in tables 7 and 8. We focus on two problems: endogeneity and 
simultaneous changes in dependent variables. The endogeneity problem comes with the 
possibility that these dual class firms issued loans first, and then they choose to transform to dual 
class firms to benefit from the large controls over the firm. It means that lenders provide the 
loans in the environment when the firm face less agency problems, after the choice of dual class 
policy, the firms exacerbate agency conflicts, which should match to loans issued for large 
agency conflicts firms. In this way, our OLS results may be biased due to this kind of causality 
between dual class share structure and issued loans. An effective way to cure this problem is to 
use instrumental variables (IV) that are correlated with dual class structure choice but do not 
affect debt issuance directly. Since valid instruments are very difficult to find, we follow 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) and use the following instruments that they propose: an 
indicator for being in the media industry at the IPO year (MEDIA IPO), the percentile ranking of 
the IPO-year sales of the firm relative to other firms with the same IPO year (SALESRANK IPO), 
the percentile ranking of the IPO-year profits of the firm relative to other firms in the same IPO 
year (PROFITRANK IPO), the percentage of all Compustat firms located in the same 
metropolitan or micropolitan statistical area (MSA) as the firm in the year before the firm’s IPO 
(%FIRM MSA IPO), the percentage of all Compustat sales by firms located in the same MSA as 
a firm in the year before the firm’s IPO (%SALE MSA IPO), and the ratio of the firm’s sales to 
the sales of all firms in the same region (SALE/REG SALES). Following Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2010), we argue that each of these variables are likely to be related to the value of 
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control and therefore to the likelihood of adopting dual class share structures but are unlikely to 
be related to debt issuance parameters.  
The results of 2SLS analysis are presented in Table 7
7
. Panel A shows the second stage 
regression results. We have two surprising findings. First, for Interest, the coefficient of DUAL 
becomes significant for the first time, which indicates that, after controlling the endogeneity, the 
debt in dual class firms has higher interest spread. Our first hypothesis is supported here. Second, 
for Syndication, the coefficient of DUAL becomes negative with high significance. This result 
runs counter to our fourth hypothesis about syndication, which indicates that the debt in dual 
class firms is more likely to be syndicated. The other results about maturity, c_covenant, 
p_covenant and secured are almost the same as we get from tables before. Besides, Panel B 
shows the diagnostics for instrumental variables. We use Sargan, Cragg-Donald and Stock-Yogo 
tests to check the effectiveness of our instrumental variables. All these test statistics show that 
the instrumental variables we use are effective. 
However, the variables may also affect each other as shown by Billett et al. (2007).  It 
may be interesting to estimate the full system of simultaneous equations by full information 
maximum likelihood method (FIML). It includes three equations as a system and estimates them 
at the same time. From table 8, we find that DUAL is negative and significant for interest spread 
for the first time. This result is consistent with the finding of Anderson and Reeb (2003)
8
, which 
indicates that the alignments of insiders and debtholders benefit the insiders with lower cost of 
debt. Moreover, the coefficient of DUAL is negative and significant for maturity, and it is 
positive and significant for covenant. These two coefficients can be explained by the larger 
agency problems in dual class firms between insiders and debtholders. The details about FIML 
are illustrated below the table 8. However, it should be noted that the maximum likelihood 
estimates for the FIML estimation were not very stable to alternate specifications. Also, the 
relation between DUAL and maturity is opposite to that observed in all the other tests suggesting 
that the results from the FIML estimations may not be very reliable. The only conclusion that is 
robust to all specifications is that of greater use of covenants by dual class firms.  
                                                          
7
 The endogenous variable of interest is DUAL which is an indicator variable. As a result, the standard instrumental 
variables procedures may not in general give reliable results. The conclusions of table 7, therefore, should be treated 
as indicative.  
8
 Anderson, Ronald C., Sattar A. Mansi, and David M. Reeb. "Founding family ownership and the agency cost of 
debt." Journal of Financial economics68.2 (2003): 263-285 
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Overall, our results suggest a robust relationship between covenant usage (especially p-
covenant usage) and dual class firms. At least in this respect it appears that dual class share 
structures exacerbate the conflict between controlling shareholders and lenders. However, our 
remaining results provide conflicting evidence. As a result, we are unable to draw clear 
conclusions with respect to the rest of our hypotheses.  
 
V. Conclusion 
While Dey, Nilolaev and Wang (2012) show a link between dual class firms and 
leverage, they do not explore the debt issuance process. We contribute to the prior literature by 
filling this gap: examine the impact of dual class share structures on the parameters of debt 
issuance. We find that, as compared to the debt in single class firms, the debt in dual class firms 
is associated with more use of secured loans and covenants especially performance based 
covenants. However, our results are mixed for the remaining parameters of debt issuance. We 
start with two sets of hypotheses that could explain the behavior of dual class firms. On one hand, 
dual class firms deteriorate the conflict of interests between equity holders and debt holders due 
to the excess power of equity holders (first kind of agency problem), which results in more use of 
performance based covenants and secured loans. On the other hand, dual class firms also 
deteriorate the conflict between majority and minority equity holders (second kind of agency 
problem). Insiders align their interest with debtholders to expropriate minority equity holders. 
This bonding relationship benefit dual class firms with longer maturity.  In the subsample tests, 
we observe the same findings in highly leveraged while less profitable firms as in OLS. The 
result in large firms give us confidence that dual class share structure will result in larger agency 
problems and further affect the debt issuance parameters .  
Overall, the net effect of dual class shares on debt issuance is a complex one and neither 
effect appears to dominate. Moreover, the findings appear to be somewhat sensitive to the 
econometric specification. We believe future further research is required to better understand the 
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Firm level variables 
Dual An indicator variable taking the value of one if a firm is a dual class firm. 
Firmsize Log of the book value of total assets 
Btm The ratio of the book value of equity over market value of equity  
Roa The ratio of the income before extraordinary items over average total assets 
Profitability The ratio of EBITDA to total assets, estimated in the year prior to entering into 
a loan contract. 
Zscore An indicator variable taking the value of one if Z-score is smaller than 1.8.  
Z-score=3.3*EBIT/AT+1.0*SALE/AT+1.4*RE/AT+1.2*WCAP/AT 
+0.6*PRCC_F*CSHO 
Leverage The ratio of the long-term debt to total asset, estimated in the year prior to 
entering into a loan contract. 
Loss An indicator variable that equals 1 if net income before extraordinary 
items(UNIAMI) is negative, and 0 otherwise 
Freecash ratio of operating cash flows(OANCF) to total assets 
Creditrating SPCSRC,  S&P Quality Ranking 
Assettangibility The ratio of net PPE to total assets, estimated in the year prior to entering into 
















where CA is the current assets of a firm , 
PPE is the net property, plant and equipment, COGS is the cost of goods sold, 
and Deprecation is the depreciation and amortization expense. The asset 
maturity measure is estimated in the year prior to entering into a loan contract. 
Dealscan variables 
Purpose An indicator variable taking the value of one if the facility’s primary purpose 
is Takeover, LBO/MBO or recapitalization, zero otherwise. A loan with a 
primary purpose of recapitalization is a loan to support a material change in a 
firm’s capital structure, often made in conjunction with other debt or equity 
offerings. 
Revolver An indicator variable taking the value of one if the facility’s type is revolver, 
zero otherwise. 
Interest The interest rate spread is based on the all-in-spread-drawn measure reported 
by dealscan. This measure is equal to the amount the borrower pays in basis 
points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down, so it accounts for both the 
spread of the loan and the annual fee paid to the bank group. 
Itcb An indicator variable that takes value of one when investment tax credit is 
present, zero otherwise 
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Netoperating TLCF, an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm’s net operating 
is negative, zero otherwise 
Institutional An indicator variable taking the value of one if the loan’s type is term loan B,C 
or D (institutional term loans), zero otherwise 
Loansize Log of the facility amount 
Maturity is estimated by the number of months between the facility’s issue date and the 
date when the facility matures 
Secured An indicator variable taking the value of one if the facility is backed by 
collateral, zero otherwise 
Syndication An indicator variable taking the value of one if the distribution style is 
syndication, zero otherwise 
C_covenant the number of capital based covenants 
P_covenant the number of performance based covenants 
Performance-
covenants 
(1) Cash interest coverage ratio, (2) Debt service coverage ratio, (3) Level of 
EBITDA, (4) Fixed charge coverage ratio, (5) Interest coverage ratio, (6) Ratio 
of debt to EBITDA, and (7) Ratio of senior debt to EBITDA. 
Capital-
covenants 
(1) Quick ratio∗, (2) Current ratio∗, (3) Debt-to-equity ratio, (4) Loan-to-value 
ratio, (5) Ratio of debt to tangible net worth, (6) Leverage ratio, (7) Senior 







Appendix II: Tables 
Table 1: Data description 
Year 
Dual Single 
# Firmsize Leverage Profitability # Firmsize Leverage Profitability 
1995 1 4.75131 0.08076 -0.0527 302 4.15297 0.17173 -0.0179 
1996 1 6.04645 0.18345 0.1279 422 4.26278 0.18694 0.87902 
1997 6 6.3665 0.11759 0.17168 534 4.41472 0.15728 1.39416 
1998 32 5.62072 0.18998 0.09118 647 4.76614 0.19227 0.64379 
1999 46 6.24805 0.27591 0.08469 693 5.30513 0.20524 -0.0081 
2000 63 6.4782 0.26815 0.03788 684 5.62256 0.23861 0.00563 
2001 47 6.41943 0.26125 0.08638 660 5.60271 0.24812 0.00913 
2002 193 7.49042 0.43202 0.08502 2122 6.42913 0.31147 0.11003 
Total 389 6.8682808 0.3400848 0.0791106 6064 5.5008119 0.2422950 0.2909446 
Table 1 shows the data description for all firms in our sample. The second and sixth column is the number 
of observations in each year from 1995 – 2002. Columns 3, 4, 5 and 7, 8, 9 show the mean value of each 
variable: firm size, leverage and profitability. Firmsize is the log of the book value of total assets; 





Table 2 Univariate test 
VARIABLE SINGLE DUAL     DIFFERENCE P-VALUE 
Variable 
name 
Mean (S) Mean (D) Mean (S)- Mean (D) P-value 
Median(S) Median (D) Median(S)-Median(D) 
Interest 
252.7 242.1 10.6 0.1238 
250 250 0 0.5204 
Maturity 
46.2328 59.0386 -12.8058 <.0001 
46 60 -14 <.0001 
Covenant 
2.5831 3.0437 -0.4606 <.0001 
2 3 -1 <.0001 
P_covenant 
1.8151 2.3702 -0.5551 <.0001 
2 2 0 <.0001 
C_covenant 
0.7680 0.6735 0.0945 0.0068 
1 1 0 0.0028 
Syndication 
0.8435 0.9203 -0.0768 <.0001 
1 1 0 <.0001 
Secured 0.8041 0.8458 -0.0417 0.0291 
 1 1 0 0.0437 
Firmsize 
5.5008 6.8683 -1.3675 <.0001 
5.5394854 7.173893 -1.63441 <.0001 
Loansize 17.6642 18.3910 -0.7268 <.0001 
 17.72753 18.64382 -0.91629 <.0001 
Creditrating 
2.3676 2.4550 -0.0874 0.0956 
3 3 0 0.0674 
Revolver 
0.5703 0.5347 0.0356 0.1701 
1 1 0 0.1701 
Purpose 
0.1826 0.1979 -0.0153 0.4472 
0 0 0 0.4472 
Institutional 
0.1209 0.2339 -0.113 <.0001 
0 0 0 <.0001 
Assetmaturit
y 
17.4812 6.2685 11.2127 0.0106 
3.654602 4.4024366 -0.74783 0.0114 
Assettangibil
ity 
0.2799 0.2948 -0.0149 0.4038 
0.187237 0.227307 -0.04007 0.0256 
Bondrate 
0.9286 0.9383 -0.0097 0.4694 
1 1 0 0.4694 
Leverage 
0.2423 0.3401 -0.0978 <.0001 
0.176214 0.270789 -0.09458 <.0001 
BTM 
4.1948 0.4830 3.7118 <.0001 




-0.0782 -0.0986 0.0204 0.8803 
0.013947 -0.01963 0.033577 <.0001 
Netoperating 
0.4507 0.5887 -0.138 0.0002 
0 1 -1 <.0001 
ITCB 
1.6613 0 1.6613 0.1614 
0 0 0 0.0195 
Z-score 
0.4763 0.6195 -0.1432 <.0001 
0 1 -1 <.0001 
Convertible 
0.0996 0.1362 -0.0366 0.0205 
0 0 0 0.0206 
Profitability 
0.2909 0.0791 0.2118 0.1233 
0.101575 0.079789 0.021786 0.0101 
Table 2 presents the comparisons of the mean and median firm-level and deal-level variables between 
dual class firms and the single class firms. The variables are defined as follows (see Appendix I for 
detailed definitions and their sources): Interest is the interest rate spread based on the all-in-spread-drawn 
measure reported by dealscan; Maturity is estimated by the number of months between the facility’s issue 
date and the date when the facility matures; Covenant is the total number of covenants; P_covenant is the 
number of performance based covenants; c_covenant is the number of capital based covenants; 
Syndication is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the distribution style is syndication, zero 
otherwise; Secured is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the facility is backed by collateral, 
zero otherwise; Firmsize is the log of the book value of total assets; Loansize is the log of the facility 
amount; Creditrating is S&P Quality Ranking; Revolver is an indicator variable taking the value of one if 
the facility’s type is revolver, zero otherwise; Purpose is an indicator variable taking the value of one if 
the facility’s primary purpose is Takeover, LBO/MBO or recapitalization, zero otherwise; Institutional is 
an indicator variable taking the value of one if the loan’s type is term loan B,C or D (institutional term 
loans), zero otherwise; Assetmaturity is the maturity of assets; Assettangibility is the ratio of net PPE to 
total assets; Leverage is the ratio of the long-term debt to total asset, estimated in the year prior to 
entering into a loan contract; BTM is the ratio of the book value of equity over market value of equity; 
ROA is the ratio of the income before extraordinary items over average total assets; Netoperating is an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm’s net operating is negative, zero otherwise; ITCB is 
an indicator variable that takes value of one when investment tax credit is present, zero otherwise; Z-score 
is an indicator variable taking the value of one if Z-score is smaller than 1.8; Convertible is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the firm has convertible debt, zero otherwise; Profitability is the ratio of 
EBITDA to total assets. The comparison of means is based on a two-sided t-test, and the comparison of 




Table 3 Regression Analyses of Debt Issuance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Interest 1 Interest 2 Interest 3 Interest 4 maturity 1 maturity2 maturity3 maturity 4 covenant 1 covenant 2 covenant3 covenant4 
                          
dual -10.60** 5.215 -11.27* 2.055 12.81*** 9.396*** 11.46*** 9.392*** 0.461*** 0.397*** 0.416*** 0.385*** 
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Constant 252.7*** 771.5*** 252.8*** 787.8*** 46.23*** 32.96*** 46.31*** 35.53*** 2.583*** 1.261*** 2.586* 1.328* 
 
(1.714) (19.66) (0.353) (31.65) (0.316) (1.186) (0.145) (2.296) (0.0154) (0.147) (0.00336) (0.624) 
             Observations 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 
R-squared 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.220 0.015 0.058 0.012 0.040 0.008 0.056 0.007 0.050 
Number of year 
  





year FE     YES YES    YES YES     YES YES 
Table 3 shows the basic regression results. The dependent variables are interest spread, maturity and covenant. For each dependent variable, we do 
four regressions: with and without control variables, with and without year effect. Interest is the interest rate spread based on the all-in-spread-
drawn measure reported by dealscan; Maturity is estimated by the number of months between the facility’s issue date and the date when the 
facility matures; Covenant is the total number of covenants; Dual is an indicator variable taking the value of one if a firm is a dual class firm; 
Loansize is the log of the facility amount; Firmsize is the log of the book value of total assets; Creditrating is S&P Quality Ranking; Revolver is an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if the facility’s type is revolver, zero otherwise; Purpose is an indicator variable taking the value of one if 
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the facility’s primary purpose is Takeover, LBO/MBO or recapitalization, zero otherwise; Institutional is an indicator variable taking the value of 
one if the loan’s type is term loan B,C or D (institutional term loans), zero otherwise; BTM is the ratio of the book value of equity over market 
value of equity; Assetmaturity is the maturity of assets; Assettangibility is the ratio of net PPE to total assets; Leverage is the ratio of the long-term 
debt to total asset; ROA is the ratio of the income before extraordinary items over average total assets. ***Significant at the 1% 




Table 4 Regression Analyses on Financial Covenants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES c_covenant 1 c_covenant 2 c_covenant 3 c_covenant 4 p_covenant 1 p_covenant 2 p_covenant 3 p_covenant 4 
         
dual -0.0945*** 0.00496 0.00274 0.00274 0.555*** 0.392*** 0.382*** 0.382*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0343) (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0655) (0.0626) (0.0824) (0.0824) 
leverage  -0.0713**  -0.0693  0.925***  0.910*** 
  (0.0341)  (0.0981)  (0.0613)  (0.0850) 
firmsize  -0.0151***  -0.0153*  -0.0571***  -0.0654*** 
  (0.00536)  (0.00785)  (0.00918)  (0.0150) 
btm  0.000790***  0.000804***  -0.00199***  -0.00196*** 
  (0.000238)  (0.000188)  (0.000367)  (0.000447) 
roa  2.68e-05  0.000172  0.000194  0.000318 
  (0.00289)  (0.00274)  (0.00466)  (0.00662) 
loansize  -0.0960***  -0.0946***  0.188***  0.186*** 
  (0.00538)  (0.0118)  (0.00909)  (0.0417) 
revolver  -0.0270*  -0.0288  -0.172***  -0.157*** 
  (0.0160)  (0.0325)  (0.0281)  (0.0333) 
Constant 0.768*** 2.577*** 2.553*** 2.553*** 1.815*** -1.316*** -1.225 -1.225 
 (0.00855) (0.0800) (0.178) (0.178) (0.0147) (0.134) (0.772) (0.772) 
         
Observations 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 
R-squared 0.001 0.093 0.080 0.080 0.013 0.137 0.116 0.116 
Number of year   8 8   8 8 
year FE   YES YES   YES YES 
Table 4 presents the regressions of c_covenant and p_covenant. The dependent variables are c_covenant and p_covenant. For each dependent 
variable, we do four regressions: with and without control variables, with and without year effect. P_covenant is the number of performance based 
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covenants; c_covenant is the number of capital based covenants; Dual is an indicator variable taking the value of one if a firm is a dual class firm; 
Leverage is the ratio of the long-term debt to total asset, Loansize is the log of the facility amount; Firmsize is the log of the book value of total 
assets; BTM is the ratio of the book value of equity over market value of equity; ROA is the ratio of the income before extraordinary items over 
average total assets; Revolver is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the facility’s type is revolver, zero otherwise; ***Significant at the 





Table 5 Regression Analyses of Syndication and Secured 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES syndication 1 syndication 2 syndication 3 syndication 4 secured 1 secured 2 secured 3 secured 4 
         
dual 0.762*** 0.0181 0.4224** 0.1307 0.290** 0.691*** 0.3691** 0.6731*** 
 (0.191) (0.241) (0.1954) (0.2397) (0.144) (0.153) (0.1451) (0.1533) 
firmsize  0.144***  0.0735***  -0.330***  -0.3484*** 
  (0.0308)  (0.0302)  (0.0285)  (0.0248) 
loansize  0.914***  0.9252***  -0.272***  -0.2829*** 
  (0.0423)  (0.0340)  (0.0330)  (0.0274) 
btm  0.000857  0.00149  -0.00196**  -0.00186* 
  (0.00238)  (0.00286)  (0.000765)  (0.00103) 
leverage  1.009***  0.9696***  1.926***  -1.8460*** 
  (0.233)  (0.2367)  (0.182)  (0.1860) 
zscore      0.126*  0.1421* 
      (0.0757)  (0.0783) 
Constant 1.685*** -14.49*** 2.8768*** -13.7355*** 1.412*** 7.789*** 1.1936*** -8.2418*** 
 (0.0353) (0.671) (0.0945) (0.5353) (0.0324) (0.508) (0.0506) (0.4511) 
         
Observations 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 6,453 
Number of 
year 
  8 8   8 8 
year FE   YES YES   YES YES 
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Table 5 presents the regressions of syndication and secured. The dependent variables are syndication and secured. For each dependent variable, we 
do four regressions: with and without control variables, with and without year effect. Syndication is an indicator variable taking the value of one if 
the distribution style is syndication, zero otherwise; Secured is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the facility is backed by collateral, 
zero otherwise; Dual is an indicator variable taking the value of one if a firm is a dual class firm; Loansize is the log of the facility amount; 
Firmsize is the log of the book value of total assets; BTM is the ratio of the book value of equity over market value of equity; Z-score is an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if Z-score is smaller than 1.8; ***Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level; *Significant 




Table6 Subsample test 
Panel A: subsample for leverage (median) 
Low leverage 
  
interest maturity c_covenant p_covenant syndication secured 
DUAL 5.44554 -2.37725 0.05897 0.2522 -0.3727 -0.2153 
P-value 0.5382 0.1715 0.1725 0.0006 0.1359 0.3239 
high leverage 
DUAL 12.0942 12.26392 0.04363 0.4641 -0.0269 -1.1678 
P-value 0.1067 <.0001 0.1612 <.0001 0.9297 <.0001 
F value 0.29 22.94 0.26 6.28 0.8744 6.4738 
Pr > F 0.5886 <.0001 0.6121 0.0122 0.3497 0.0109 
Panel B: subsample for size (median) 
small size 
  interest maturity c_covenant p_covenant syndication secured 
DUAL -0.7294 0.1496 0.0959 0.0427 0.0908 -0.6538 
P-value 0.947 0.9359 0.0743 0.6455 0.7095 0.162 
large size 
DUAL 8.79932 8.2566 0.0199 0.5254 -0.836 -0.7468 
P-value 0.176 <.0001 0.4444 <.0001 0.0369 <.0001 
F value 0.66 19.61 3.76 8.78 1.4046 0.1054 
Pr > F 0.4166 <.0001 0.0527 0.0031  0.2360  0.7454 
Panel C: subsample for profitability (median) 
low profitability 
  interest maturity c_covenant p_covenant syndication secured 
DUAL 10.7505 7.6292 -0.026 0.5374 -0.301 -0.9071 
P-value 0.1574 <.0001 0.4693 <.0001 0.238 <.0001 
high profitability 
DUAL -5.7794 3.8313 0.1503 0.1163 -0.3333 -0.3634 
P-value 0.5157 0.0277 <.0001 0.1373 0.2688 0.1223 
F value 2.3 20.61 14.73 27.8 1.1349 4.4342 
Pr > F 0.1292 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001  0.2867  0.0352 
Table 6 is the result for subsample tests. Firms are divided into subsamples by the median of full sample’s 
leverage, firm size and profitability. In each subsample, the dependent variables are the same: Interest, 
maturity, c_covenant, p_covenant, syndication and secured. The regression equations include the DUAL 
and control variables. For brevity, only the coefficient of Dualclass and its p- value are provided for each 
subsample. F value is the statistics for the test of equal slopes in two subsamples.  
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Table 7 Robustness test 1: Endogeneity test 




Continuous dependent variable Dummy dependent 
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interest Maturity C_covenant P_covenant Syndication Secured 
       
dual 250.2*** 51.36*** -0.0743 2.422*** -2.214*** 3.613*** 
 (35.16) (6.970) (0.174) (0.324) (0.449) (0.145) 
firmsize -8.304*** 1.525*** -0.00918 -0.0971*** 0.115*** -0.166*** 
 (1.347) (0.217) (0.00660) (0.0123) (0.0156) (0.0118) 
loansize -25.81***  -0.0961*** 0.204*** 0.415*** -
0.0875*** 
 (1.258)  (0.00588) (0.0110) (0.0339) (0.0137) 
institutional 69.67***      
 (6.161)      
purpose 17.50***      
 (4.622)      
creditrating -11.47*** -0.775**     
 (1.716) (0.346)     
btm 0.00399  0.00102*** -0.000919 -0.00136 0.000126 
 (0.0669)  (0.000325) (0.000607) (0.00116) (0.000613) 
revolver -28.80***  -0.0137 -0.193***   
 (3.988)  (0.0170) (0.0317)   
assetmaturity  0.000672     
  (0.00101)     
assettangibility  3.506***     
  (0.991)     
leverage   -0.0718* 0.835*** 0.499*** 0.547*** 
   (0.0371) (0.0691) (0.116) (0.0944) 
roa   0.000303 0.0206**   
   (0.00535) (0.00997)   
zscore      -0.0315 
      (0.0368) 
Constant 772.6*** 36.22*** 2.545*** -1.457*** -6.648*** 2.762*** 
 (18.45) (1.331) (0.0872) (0.163) (0.511) (0.264) 
Observations 5,866 5,866 5,866 5,866 5,866 5,866 
First stage R-
squared 
0.0698 0.0679 0.0681 0.0681   
Second stage R-
squared 
0.020 -0.1198 0.087 -0.0262   
Panel B: Diagnostics for instrumental variables 
Sargan 85.882*** 321.310*** 110.926*** 116.256***   
F-value 44.047 45.412 42.097 42.097   
Stock-Yogo  29.18 29.18 29.18 29.18   
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Table 7 test the endogeneity problem in these models. Panel A shows the results. Panel B reports 
diagnostics: Sargan, F-value and stock-yogo. Sargan is Sargan statistic for overidentification test of all 
instruments.  F-value is the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for Weak identification. Stock-Yogo is the 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value of 10% maximal IV size. Interest is the interest rate spread based 
on the all-in-spread-drawn measure reported by dealscan; Maturity is estimated by the number of months 
between the facility’s issue date and the date when the facility matures; P_covenant is the number of 
performance based covenants; c_covenant is the number of capital based covenants; Syndication is an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if the distribution style is syndication, zero otherwise; Secured 
is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the facility is backed by collateral, zero otherwise; Dual 
is an indicator variable taking the value of one if a firm is a dual class firm; Loansize is the log of the 
facility amount; Firmsize is the log of the book value of total assets; Institutional is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one if the loan’s type is term loan B,C or D (institutional term loans), zero otherwise;  
Purpose is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the facility’s primary purpose is Takeover, 
LBO/MBO or recapitalization, zero otherwise; Creditrating is S&P Quality Ranking; BTM is the ratio of 
the book value of equity over market value of equity; Revolver is an indicator variable taking the value of 
one if the facility’s type is revolver, zero otherwise; Assetmaturity is the maturity of assets; 
Assettangibility is the ratio of net PPE to total assets; Leverage is the ratio of the long-term debt to total 
asset; ROA is the ratio of the income before extraordinary items over average total assets; Z-score is an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if Z-score is smaller than 1.8.R-squared 1is the first stage R-
square. R-squared 2 is the second stage R-squared. ***Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% 





Table 8 Robustness test 2:  FIML 
Three equation system: (Interest, maturity, covenant) 
Panel A : OLS 
 Interest Maturity Covenant 
DUAL 5.215 9.396*** 0.397*** 
 (4.976) (1.451) (0.0664) 
Panel B: FIML 
DUAL -61.6486*** -4.56301** 0.207789*** 
 (22.8466) (2.1135) (0.0636) 
Interest  -0.03127*** 0.002629*** 
  (0.0104) (0.000691) 
Maturity -6.37331**  0.020563*** 
 (3.0719)  (0.00323) 
Covenant 297.9993*** 33.26515***  
 (99.9675) (1.8549)  
Root MSE 350.1 40.0553 1.1571 
Observations 6453 6453 6453 
Log Likelihood -78176 
Table 8 shows the result of full information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML). It focuses on the 
problem of simultaneous changes in these dependent variables: interest, maturity and covenant. OLS 
results are shown in Panel A as a comparison. For brevity, we suppress control variables.  For Panel A, 
these regressions use the same model as in equations (1) to (3). For Interest, the control variables are 
loansize, firmsize, creditrating, revolver, purpose, institutional and btm. For Maturity, the control 
variables are firmsize, creditrating, assetmaturity, assettangibility, purpose and btm. For covenant, the 
control variables are firmsize, revolver, security, loansize, roa and leverage.  
Panel B shows the results for FIML and run the three equations as a system. For Interest, the independent 
variables are DUAL, Maturity, Covenant and controls. For Maturity, the independent variables are DUAL, 
Interest, Covenant and controls. For Covenant, the independent variables are DUAL, Interest, Maturity 
and controls. All controls used are the same as in OLS. Interest is the interest rate spread based on the all-
in-spread-drawn measure reported by dealscan; Maturity is estimated by the number of months between 
the facility’s issue date and the date when the facility matures; Covenant is the total number of covenants; 
DUAL is an indicator variable taking the value of one if a firm is a dual class firm; ***Significant at the 
1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. ; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
